CO129-371 - Public Offices - 1910 — Page 81

(This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

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contingency. This, of course, I was unable to do, and eventually on the 8th December M. Brederode, acting upon instructions from his Government, submitted a formal request for arbitration to the Wai-wu Pu, proposing at the same time that the status quo should be strictly observed by both parties until the final decision of The Hague Tribunal should be received.

A copy of this communication forms enclosure No. 4 in this despatch.*

In the meantime, on the 30th November, the Wai-wu Pu had addressed a note to the Portuguese Legation in which, after expressing their regret at the rupture of the negotiations, they declared that the status quo should be observed, and the Portuguese would be held responsible for any encroachment on Chinese rights.

On the 7th December a telegram was received from the Governor of Macao stating that Chinese troops had landed that morning on the island of Dom João, and were reported to have killed and arrested people, and to have carried away several vessels belonging to a village which had been under Portuguese jurisdiction since

1875.

A further telegram received on the following day explained that the troops, whose number was estimated at from 200 to 400 men, had left at noon on the day on which they had landed, and that their object had been to arrest fugitive criminals.

A

His Majesty's consul-general at Canton, to whom I telegraphed for particulars, informed me in due course that a cruiser under the command of Admiral Li had chased a piratical cruft, the occupants of which had taken refuge on the island. landing party was sent ashore, and the pirates were arrested. The vessels which had been carried off had, Mr. Jamieson understood, been restored. The Canton authorities were, be thought, prepared to admit that neither Power should exercise jurisdiction over Dom João pending the settlement of the delimitation question, but they held that they were justified, in the circumstances, in continuing the pursuit and effecting the arrest of the pirates.

On the 10th instant I had an interview with the Wai-wu Pu, when I used my best efforts to induce them to accede to the Portuguese demand for arbitration. I said that the request was an eminently reasonable one, and quoted several instances in which boundary questions of this kind had been submitted to arbitration by the great Powers of Europe and America. China had herself recently made an appeal to The Hague Tribunal in a somewhat similar question, and she could scarcely refuse to Portugal what she had demanded from Japan.

Liang Tun-yen, the Minister present, said they had come to the conclusion that arbitration was not desirable either in the interests of China or Portugal, who should be left to settle the matter between themselves, in view of the many local issues involved.

I expressed great regret at this decision which, I felt sure, would be received with disappointment by His Majesty's Government who had done so much to promote a friendly adjustment of the Macao question.

In a note received the same evening, copy of which I have the honour to enclose,* the Chinese Government, formally notified to the Portuguese chargé d'affaires their refusal to accept arbitration.

I am,

&c.

J. N. JORDAN,

[B]

AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

[149]

No. 1.

REC

2765

[January 28 JAN 10]

SECTION 4.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received January 3, 1910.)

(No. 673.) Sir,

St. Petersburgh, December 25, 1909. DURING a visit which I was paying to M. Isvolsky yesterday his Excelleney said that he wished to speak to me in regard to a remarkable communication which he had received from the United States Embassy. He then read to me a memo- randum which in most of its particulars was similar to that communicated on the 9th November by Mr. Whitelaw Reid. It did not, however, make any mention of the Chin-Chow-Aigun agreement, and I understand from Mr. Rockhill that he had omitted this scheme in the memorandum which he had communicated to M. Isvolsky. M. Isvolsky asked me if I had had any knowledge of the proposal to internationalise all Manchurian railways. I said that among the papers on various matters of interest which I received periodically there had been some documents relating to the matter, but that I had not been furnished with any instructions on the subject. His Excellency remarked that the scheme was a very vast one, and would require a very large loan for its realisation. The Russian interests alone could be estimated at many million pounds. He had some doubts if the Japanese Government would view the project favourably. I asked whether he could tell me what impression the proposal had made upon him, and whether the Russian Government would be inclined to entertain it. M. Isvolsky said that he could not express any views on the subject. The question would have to be most carefully studied, and he would prefer to abstain from giving any opinion. He understood from the United States Embassy that His Majesty's Government had agreed in principle to the project.

M. Isvolsky said that there was another question on which he wished to speak to me. It would appear from information which had reached him that a preliminary agreement had been signed between an Anglo-American syndicate and the Chinese Government for the construction of a railway from Chin-Chow to Aigun. Thus would be a matter of serious concern to the Russian Government. The proposed railway for some part of its length would run parallel to the Eastern Chinese Railway, then cross that line and go right up to the Russian frontier on the Amur. Both ou commercial and strategical grounds such a line would gravely affect Russian interests. He enquired whether I had any knowledge of this project, aud gave me to understand, though he did not positively say so, that he was surprised that he had not been informed. I replied that I had read in certain documents that such a line was in contemplation, but I was unaware whether a contract had been sigued. I did not tell M. Isvolsky as to the proposal that the Japanese Government should be asked to participate in the line, as this would have rendered him more dissatisfied at Russia having been neglected. M. Isvolsky explained to me the importance of the question to Russian interests, but I did not encourage him to dwell on the subject.

The impression produced upon me was that M. Isvolsky viewed the project in a serious light, and that he would be much displeased if a scheme, which he evidently considers closely affects important Russian interests, were favoured by His Majesty's Government without any opportunity being afforded to Russia to express her views. I should imagine, too, that the Russian public will be much perturbed if at this moment it became known that a line of strategical importance was being contemplated in Manchuria under Anglo-American, and possibly Japanese, auspices. These railway combinations and projects in districts so closely connected with Russian interests are being brought forward simultaneously with the revival of the Bagdad Railway, and this conjunction may create in the public mind an atmosphere unfavourable to the Anglo-Russian entente. They are all questions on which Russia feels strongly.

I have, &c.

A. NICOLSON.

* Not printed.

[2605 c-4]